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Letter dated April 2003 reporting on the first quarter
of 2003
In my last quarterly
letter, I alluded to the impact of war and/or terrorism on the market and
stated that: “Stock valuations seem reasonable if not compelling….If the
market should decline, I don’t think that current valuations will be to
blame.” I think that’s what happened: in the absence of compelling
valuations, the tensions related to Iraq were enough to pull the market
modestly lower. But the huge rally when the war finally broke out may be
indicative of pent-up demand.
The market was
incredibly volatile, and though the week of St. Patrick’s Day was the best
up week since 1982, the S&P 500 still lost 3.6% for the quarter. I
have maintained a fairly defensive posture, and so your account lost xx%
in this period – beating the market by a fairly respectable margin. I don’t
want to become overly defensive because the mid-March rally showed what this
market is capable of doing if the international situation improves.
The 200 day moving
average has been quite an amazing barometer of the long term trend. For
three years, the S&P 500 Index has approached that level many times but has
never been able to sustain a move above it. In the huge St. Patrick’s week
rally, we traded right up to that level and actually closed slightly north
of it. It felt like an unstoppable freight train. But the next Monday, it
plunged 3.5% in a day. As I write, the market has opened above the 200 day
moving average once again. But whether this finally represents a trend
change or yet another failure is not yet clear. Who knows, it may be much
clearer by the time you get this letter.
Valuations remain
reasonable, though not compelling. In other words, the P/E ratio is right
in the middle of its range of the last 50 years. The bearish valuation case
is that major bottoms in 1987 and 1990 occurred with the P/E ratio between
10 and 11, suggesting there is ample room for the market to fall further.
The bullish valuation case is that the P/E ratio has to be looked at
relative to interest rates, and when you compare the earnings yield on
stocks to the rate on five year Treasury notes, the market is reasonably
inexpensive. Consider:
|
Period |
PE |
Earnings Yield |
5yr Treasury |
Spread |
Ratio |
|
1987 low |
10.6 |
9.43 |
8.85 |
0.58 |
1.07 |
|
1990 low |
10.2 |
9.80 |
8.55 |
1.25 |
1.15 |
|
Now |
14.9 |
6.71 |
3.00 |
3.71 |
2.24 |
The bullish case is even
stronger if you look at the spread on a ratio basis: the earnings
yield on stocks is more than twice the yield available on five year
Treasuries. That ratio reached an extreme of 2.4 at the 1974 low. That’s a
pretty strong gap in favor of stocks, as long as those earnings don’t
evaporate. It would be far better if the comparison were just as favorable
between Treasury yields and dividends, but that is not the case (due in part
to how our tax code penalizes dividends).
There are analysts
who say that the market’s P/E ratio is still about 30, but that way of
measuring earnings takes into account a few major accounting write-downs
that have to do with post-merger GAAP accounting for goodwill and very
little to do with real operating earnings. This is worth explaining in a
little more detail. Let’s take AOL for example. In January, the company
posted a quarterly loss of $10.04 per share by announcing a $45 billion
write-down of assets. Did AOL, whose entire market capitalization is $50
billion, really lose $45 billion in one quarter? No! They simply adjusted
their books to reduce the stated value of some of their “intellectual
property”. But some market analysts, who use GAAP rather than operating
earnings, subtracted that $45 billion from the total earnings of the other
S&P 500 companies in calculating overall earnings and the resultant P/E
ratio. Although this is technically accurate GAAP accounting, it is also a
place where GAAP technicalities obscure an accurate picture of earnings from
current operations.
The Value Line
approach more realistically reflects operating earnings. Each week, they
report “the median of estimated price-earnings ratios of all stocks with
earnings (emphasis added). That number was 14.9 at the end of
March. While that number may not reflect the hit to earnings from executive
stock options, it is still a pretty reasonable measure. Plus Value Line’s
historical data is readily accessible, so it is easy to compare periods as I
did above. Sorry to be long-winded here, but you read so many different
accounts of the market’s P/E ratio in business articles that I thought it
was worth some elaboration.
Some people believe
that the market will not bottom until we’ve retraced the entire bubble of
the 1990s. We can conjure up any number of bogeymen to make that case.
Overextended consumers. Government deficits will trigger higher interest
rates, and that will hurt the market. The trade gap will continue to widen,
causing a run on the dollar, and sales of US assets by foreign investors.
Terrorism. Iraq. North Korea. Real men want to invade Teheran.
Etcetera. It’s hard to judge when these are truly negative factors, and
when they are simply part of the proverbial “wall of worry” that a bull
market climbs. Just for perspective, consider some other recent bogeymen:
Ravi Batra’s best-selling “The Great Depression of 1990” (1985), the ’87
crash, Persian Gulf crisis (1990), market plunge on Gorbachev ouster (1991),
Fed raises interest rates six times (1994), impeachment (1998), etc. Since
I can’t divine the geopolitical future and since there are good businesses
even in a bad economy, my energy is better spent looking for promising
investment opportunities.
We did a decent job
of that in the first quarter, and outperformed the market by a respectable
amount. But as usual, there were certainly some regrettable investments.
We did well betting on a turnaround in the oil refining cycle, buying Tesoro
Petroleum at $4.69; it ended the quarter at $7.40. Also in the energy
sector, we did well in ConocoPhillips, an oil major which has little
exposure to the Persian Gulf region. We bought the stock late last year,
and it rallied 10.8% for the quarter as crude oil prices rose.
It is worth noting
that the Nasdaq, which led the bear market decline, has recently
outperformed the S&P 500. In fact, it has been above its 200 day moving
average for a month. We gained from a turnaround in EMC stock, which
rallied 17.8% for the quarter. Some other tech stocks showed signs of life,
notably Flextronics (+6.5%) and Intel (+4.6%). Open Text (+21.3%) produces
knowledge management collaborative software and is a newer tech holding that
has done well. Oracle was essentially flat.
Some of our best
gains were in conservative stocks with high dividends. For instance, we got
14.3% appreciation in PSE&G shares, which also have a dividend yield of
5.9%. Similarly, old reliable Thornburg Mortgage gave us modest
appreciation of 2.6% while sporting a dividend yield of 11.3%. Similarly,
Mack Cali rose by 2.2% while providing a yield of 8.1%.
We continued to
profit from the robust housing sector. Shares of Hovnanian appreciated by
9% for the quarter. We’ve also done well in shares of banks that emphasize
mortgage lending. It’s interesting that as pundits continue to speculate
about a peak in the housing market, Warren Buffett steps in and buys Clayton
Homes. I think the stocks we own are equally good values.
Obviously, it wasn’t
all good news. Cisco has just been stuck in a range. Maytag seemed like a
good investment, given its valuation and all the activity in the housing
sector. But it lost a third of its value after warning on earnings.
Michaels, which has been an old reliable, finally cracked and shed 20% of
its value. We still own it, and sense that their slowdown may have more to
do with short term difficulties in replenishing inventory than with a
falloff in demand. We moved a little too soon in buying Charles River Labs
(pharmaceutical product development) just under $30; it ended the quarter at
$25.52. And despite record earnings, Universal Forest Products fell 27% in
the quarter, in part due to fears that health claims stemming from treated
lumber will be a new avenue for tort lawyers. I think that’s probably
far-fetched, but litigation fear has kept the lid on a lot of stocks. I
thought Webex’s audio and video combination was the next great wave in
interactive communications, particularly in a world with declining business
travel. But solid gains melted all in a day, and I’ve cut our position
substantially. [some sold all]
We added some
promising new positions. For example, we bought xx shares of UT Starcom at
$21.05. The company provides telecommunications equipment in the Chinese
market. In 2002, its net sales rose 57% to $981.8 million. Earnings per
share were $0.94 in 2002, an 80% increase from a year earlier. When we
bought in, the consensus among analysts was for earnings of $1.26 in 2003.
Assume for a moment that the company can hit that and then maintain earnings
growth of 20% for five years. If it does so, it is reasonable to assume
that the P/E would be at least 20 after five years. If we buy those
assumptions, we can calculate that the stock would provide us with a
compound annual return of about 18% going forward. There are many risks,
such as the possibility of a competitor coming in with a far better, next
generation product. But based on what we know now, this seems like a very
promising investment. And you get a sense of the earnings analysis I do
before committing capital.
I’ve done similar
analysis to project similar returns on other recent buys. For instance, we
initiated a position in Headwaters, a leader in producing alternative energy
products. Countrywide Credit does mostly prime credit mortgage loans, and
is a new addition to our holdings in the financial sector. We about doubled
our money in Owens Illinois last year, and with the stock’s recent decline,
have bought a big dip which so far has become a somewhat bigger dip. Some
of the insurers seem cheap. We bought a newer company with no skeletons
(but a less diversified portfolio) called Montpelier RE at $xx, and more
recently added WR Berkley. In each of their lines, Berkley had
net-premiums-earned gains of at least 75% last year. Again using past and
projected earnings data, my model projects a compound annual return of about
18% on this stock too.
In sum, I think
we’re again running with a portfolio that has a good chance of outperforming
the market. And given valuations, the market has a good chance of
outperforming other investments and its own recent history. Keep the
faith! And thank you for your continued confidence.